I n this issue of JGIM, Kelley et al. used nationally representative survey data from the Health and Retirement Study to examine out-of-pocket household spending on medical care for 3,209 Medicare beneficiaries in the last 5 years of life.
I n this issue of JGIM, Kelley et al. used nationally representative survey data from the Health and Retirement Study to examine out-of-pocket household spending on medical care for 3,209 Medicare beneficiaries in the last 5 years of life. 1 For beneficiaries dying between 2002 and 2008, they found this spending averaged $38,688, ranging from $5,163 for decedents in the bottom quartile to $163,121 for those in the top decile.
The story emerging from the sociodemographic and clinical characteristics of decedents with high spending was not one of financially catastrophic episodes of acute illness, although such episodes almost surely contributed. Rather, decedents in the top decile of household spending were more likely to be disabled, reside in nursing homes, and have conditions predictive of disability and long-term care needs, such as strokes, falls, and dementia. For this group, 58 % of out-of-pocket spending was devoted to nursing home care. These findings serve as a sobering reminder of a major deficiency in the mix of public and private health insurance available to seniors-the lack of affordable coverage for long-term care.
High out-of-pocket spending was also concentrated among wealthier households with greater means to pay for long-term care. As the authors noted, wealthier seniors live longer and may accordingly have a higher risk for long-term care needs at the end of life. These findings beg a fundamental question not directly addressed by the analysis: how much out-of-pocket spending is too much? Certainly, a primary purpose of Medicare is to protect households against impoverishment from sickness. The program's purpose is arguably not, however, to support intergenerational transfers of wealth in affluent families with contributions from those less well-off, as might occur if limitless coverage for long-term care were included as a benefit.
Moreover, the Medicaid program already covers long-term care for Medicare beneficiaries with limited means, as indicated by only 3.4 % of participants eligible for both programs appearing in the top decile of out-of-pocket spending.
Do the study's findings then suggest a problem? Or do they suggest that wealthy seniors adequately save to cover their long-term care needs at the end of life, while Medicaid provides a sufficient safety net for others? Greater out-ofpocket spending at the end of life may not necessarily indicate financial strain, as the authors noted, but rather money well spent to obtain better quality of care or to relieve children of informal caregiving duties. To facilitate a normative interpretation, Kelley et al. compared out-ofpocket costs in the last 5 years of life to household assets at baseline. They found that baseline household assets were completely depleted by spending on medical care for 25 % of decedents. This figure likely overestimated complete spend down, because savings from income in the last 5 years of life were not considered as assets. In addition, some of the 25 %, particularly Medicaid recipients, probably had low out-of-pocket costs but few baseline assets. Setting these methodological limitations aside, the question remains: is 25 % too high? That is, to what extent does asset depletion at the end of life compromise consumption of highly valued goods or cause economic disruptions for families?
Providing perhaps the strongest evidence that 25 % does imply an underlying problem of some magnitude are signs of unmet or latent demand for long-term care insurance. Despite the substantial risk of requiring long-term nursing home care at the end of life and the widespread recognition of this risk among aging adults, few purchase long-term care insurance. 2 This mismatch is borne out in the study results. Although one in five Health and Retirement Study participants were residing in nursing homes in the last 5 years of life, including a roughly equal proportion of those not covered by Medicaid, only 7.9 % had purchased longterm care insurance to hedge against this financial risk. Based on the high demand for health insurance in general, many adults are likely willing to pay for opportunities to stabilize their financial future by transferring wealth from healthy to potentially disabled states in life and pooling their risk of permanent disability with others. In other words, many would pay now to not be among the 25 % Published online November 6, 2012 later, particularly those with resource levels well above Medicaid eligibility thresholds, but insufficient to selfinsure. Such opportunities are limited, however, in the dysfunctional long-term care insurance market.
Like the individual market for basic health insurance, the market for long-term care insurance is plagued by deficient risk pooling and adverse selection. Compounding these problems are uncertainties insurers face in predicting medical inflation and disability far into the future. For consumers, long lags between payment of premiums and receipt of benefits foster myopia and legitimate concerns that insurers will later go out of business (as many have), raise premiums (an average of 49 % since 2007), or deny claims.
2,3 Not surprisingly, adults sufficiently young to find affordable policies often forego them, and the protection offered to those with greater demand is both costly and limited.
As part of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010, the Community Living Assistance Services and Supports (CLASS) Act attempted to redress some of these failures of the private long-term care insurance market. The CLASS Act established a national voluntary program in which workers could purchase public insurance that would provide a cash benefit for home or facility care in the event they became unable to care for themselves. Amid concerns over its sustainability, the CLASS Act's implementation was halted. 4 Although still on the books as a framework for public financing of long-term care, the current political climate and fiscal condition of the federal government make its resurrection highly unlikely in the near future. Therefore, the performance of the private long-term care insurance market will likely continue to determine seniors' ability to protect themselves and their families against unwanted financial shocks in the last 5 years of life beyond the coverage afforded by Medicaid and personal savings.
The findings of Kelley et al. not only suggest a problem but are also timely, published in the wake of a Presidential race featuring two clashing views on how the federal government should grapple with the specter of fiscal Armageddon and an aging population. [5] [6] [7] Both views subscribe to a strategy of using legislated targets to control growth in Medicare spending. The key difference has to do with who absorbs the costs if spending continues to grow faster than these targets.
The (ACA) signed into law by President Obama includes a number of payment and delivery system reforms intended to slow federal spending on health care, while preserving benefits and improving clinical outcomes. Several of these provisions specifically tackle the often fragmented and costly care for patients dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid. If growth in Medicare spending is not slowed by these reforms to a target rate of gross domestic product growth plus 1 %, the ACA also directs an Independent Payment Advisory Board to recommend ways to achieve the target without altering premiums, benefits, or eligibility. Should these measures fail, mounting fiscal pressures would require contractions in who or what is covered by Medicare and Medicaid, but the clear directive of the ACA is to try first to control spending without directly shifting costs to beneficiaries to reduce the federal debt.
In contrast, Governor Romney has embraced a plan proposed by his running mate, Paul Ryan, in the House Budget Committee's recent budget resolutions. 7, 8 The Romney-Ryan plan would convert Medicare from a defined benefit to a defined contribution or "premium support" program, and convert federal funding for state Medicaid programs to block grants. Allowable per-beneficiary increases in the premium subsidies and block grants would be indexed to general inflation or economic growth, thereby instituting hard caps on federal spending for both Medicare and Medicaid. Consequently, under the likely scenario in which growth in health care costs continues to exceed growth allowed by the caps, Medicare beneficiaries would be immediately exposed to the cost difference, and states would likely have no recourse but to limit Medicaid benefits and eligibility. 9 Public financing of long-term care for Medicaid recipients could be sharply reduced under such caps. Thus, the candidates' opposing plans, which will continue to flank the health care debate, could have vastly different implications for the size of out-of-pocket liabilities for the care of older adults beyond those documented by Kelly et al.
Long valued in human history has been the ability to age and die with dignity-an ability that may require means and thus financial protection to ensure. The ancient Greeks would place a coin, an obol, in the mouths of the deceased as payment to Charon, the mythological ferryman, for transport across the river Styx. Charon's obol, or its equivalent in other cultures, guaranteed safe passage and symbolized sustenance for the journey into death. The assurances derived from such basic protections, not the preservation of assets per se, motivated Lyndon Johnson's words on the day he signed Medicare into law. Following the portion quoted by Kelley et al. in their opening paragraph, he continued, "No longer will illness crush and destroy the savings that [older Americans] have so carefully put away over a lifetime so that they might enjoy dignity in their later years." Reforming Medicare and financing longterm care to fulfill this promise is thorny business, and the stakes are high for getting it right. Romantic notions of limitless coverage for all health care services in all phases of life must be tempered by recognition of the economic costs of health care spending. Out-of-pocket spending may be neither inefficient nor unfair. Nevertheless, there is something unsettling about the findings of Kelley et al. that conjure images of the penniless dead stranded on the banks of the river Styx. After all, performance of a health care system must be measured by its ability to meet social expectations in addition to the clinical and economic benefits it produces. Thus, as the debate over health care ensues, it would seem instructive for policymakers to keep in mind an enduring human wish-to have an obol at the end.
